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EEL: A Brief Presentation 
The 1,aboratory of Experimental Economics was created in 1991 within the Department of 
Economics of the University of Trento. Its initial purpose was to  conduct experiments in analysis 
of organisational behaviour - which is still its principal area of interest although others have 
recently been added, most notably study of the formation of choice behaviour in demand for 
consumer goods and decision making in the fiscal and distributive area. 
The orgiginal idea was to develop models of 'organisational learning' which describe the 
growth of organisational and informational structures in firms and institutions, and to  conduct 
analysis and empirical verification utilizing recent techniques developed in the field of Experi- 
mental Economics. This purely experimental work is now flanked by analysis in the theoretical 
area of the organisation and the firm. Particular emphasis has been placed on the development 
of models of information structures in firms and on the representation and sirnulation of the 
rnultiactor decision processes that  unfold within them, at  the managerial and planning level and 
also from the point of view of consensus formation. The work of the Laboratory has fully borne 
out the decision to conduct research from three different disciplinary points of view: (a)  that  
of the cognitive sciences, in order to deepen understanding of learning processes by means of 
laboratory experiments and in order to model the knowledge transfer mechanisms that  charac- 
terize organisational learning; (b) that of the theory of decision support for the understanding 
and formulation of the preferences leading to the decision; (c) that  of organisational analysis in 
order t o  study the emergence of different forms of cooperation and the solution of cognitive and 
decisional conflicts; (d) that  of institutional economics, to  move into the direction of explaining 
t he rise of ecorlomic institutions on the basis of new micro-foundations. 
One indirect aim of the project is to develop a research agenda in a coordinate way with 
various groups sharing the same methodological approach. Among these groups several Italian 
universities are involved (CB Bembo at  Venice, Political Science at  Turin, the University of 
Genoa, the Bocconi University of Milan, the Universities of Modena and Trento). The Labortory 
is also cooperating in systematic manner with a number of international research centres, in 
particular with the following groups: BACH (University of Michigan), CSOM (University of 
Amsterdam), Dynamics of Computation Group (Palo Alto), SCANCOR (Stanford University), 
CCE (University of California, Los Angeles). 
The Laboratory gratefully acknowledges the support received from the University of Trento 
("Progetto Speciale") and the Italian Ministry of University and Research ("MURST" 40%). 
More information on Laboratory's research is available on INTERNET at  the location: 
http://black.cs.unitn.it. 
Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics at  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as  cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
t o  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among a,gents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The  central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better rnodeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
at,tent,ion js paid t o  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to address: 
t,hcrefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the sarne period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There arc now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
t,hc similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables tha t  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition t o  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance at  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
rnodeling techniques ought t o  address now are much more clearly defined. The  theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed to  be explained. 
The  list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way t o  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is t,llat the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant t o  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
Lions learn, search, adapt ;  second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
&(,tributes and behavioural traits;  and,  third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
rr~ultiple resea.rch efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The  research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
I .  Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
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1 The choice between organizations and markets 
In "The Role of Organizations in an Economy"' Herbert Simon focuses 
on a number of issues which are crucial for clarification of the 
relationships between economic and organizational theory. In particular 
he gives a new perspective on what has become a classical question of 
economic theory: can the firm and the market be regarded as two 
alternative forms of the organization of economic activity? 
The entire question stems from Coase's celebrated article "The Nature of 
the Firm" written in 1936, in which he compares firm and market and 
suggests that they are two economic institutions that perform the same 
task - the coordination of decisions taken by various individuals - in 
different ways. As in the market, so within the firm dispersed knowledge 
and different skills are coordinated. Within the firm, Coase notes, 
coordination takes place through orders and control, in markets through 
the price system. 
In the following pages I will discuss some of the problems arising from 
Simon's lecture, which, in relation to the New Institutionalist's' 
interpretation of the problem, offer us a very different and illuminating 
perspective on the relationship between market and organizations. 
In his lecture, Simon observes that a key point in analizing the Coase's 
intuition is to decide what meaning is to be attributed to the term 
'coordination'. We may therefore conveniently begin by examining what 
common aspects and what differences can be found between coordination 
by markets (which comes about through competition) and coordination 
"by managers" within a firm. 
It is widely known that analysis of coordination by the market has 
developed in different versions within the neoclassical school: from 
Smith's "invisible hand" to Walrasian "tatonnement", to von Hayek's 
Mattioli Lectures 1994 . The arguments are partially contained in Simon (1991) and 
( 1993) 
"competition as a procedure for discovery of the new", to mention only 
some. This is not the place to review these various versions; nevertheless 
it should be pointed out that, despite their differences of emphasis, all 
schools agree over the fact that coordination is a process by which 
different plans decided independently by different individuals becomes 
mutually compatible. 
A further feature is ascribed to the coordination process: namely that it is 
a learning procedure by means of which equilibrium prices are 
"discovered". This feature, which has been emphasised in particular by 
the Austrian school, is nevertheless also present in the Walrasian 
formulation. In Walras' analysis, in' fact, coordination takes place through 
tcztonnement: the auctioneer receives all information concerning demand 
excess and issues all information concerning prices. The interaction 
between auctioneer and agent can be interpeted as a process of collective 
learning which enables economic agents to discover the equilibrium: that 
is, the parameter values by which their plans become mutually 
compatible. Interestingly, this type of learning cannot be assimilated to 
the process of individual rational choice; on the contrary, it is a multi- 
actor cooperative process in which the part played by each agent is 
extremely limited, and the final result is achieved without the individual 
agent being aware of it; that is, the agent does not engage in an individual 
search for equilibrium prices. This is the third essential feature of 
coordination. 
We may therefore sum up the argument so far by saying that the 
coordination performed by competition has three important properties: 
1. different plans of separate individuals, drawn up independently and 
rationally, become mutually compatible; 
2. the economic system "discovers1' the correct parameter values, i.e. the 
equilibrium prices, which enable coordination to take place; 
3. The discovery process is one in which agents are unaware. 
Hence, albeit in embryonic form, coordination is interpreted as a learning 
procedure realized through competition. 
Let us now turn to the coordination that takes place within economic 
organizations. Is this process, as Coase suggests, analogous to 
coordination carried out by the invisible hand? Can we consider it to be a 
competitive process which coordinates the plans of separate individuals 
through a system of orders and thus induces individuals unwittingly to 
reach some kind of "internal organizational equilibrium"? 
Let us inspect the differences between the two cases. For the first 
characteristic above to be respected ( the mutual compatibility of plans), 
one must assume that agents within organizations - here employees and 
managers - take their decisions and formulate their plans entirely 
independently of one another, like the agents in a Walrasian atomistic 
economy. That they do not behave in this way is a well-established fact. 
Thus the description of the coordination process provided by the 
Walrasian model cannot be realistically extended "inside the black box" 
without introducing substantial modifications into the most important 
features that Walras attributed to individual planning. 
Instead of trying to define these modifications, as an alternative research 
strategy we should examine if there exists an organizational set up which 
provides individuals with all relevant information , as the in the 
Walrasian picture of "tatonnement". 
A model of this kind must have the following features: first, the tasks of 
the individuals within the organization must be perfectly identified and 
rigidly separated, as in the tayloristic caricature of the organizational 
machine; second, individuals (employees and managers) must decide 
and realize their plans following a general plan issued by a central 
coordinator. 
Only under these conditions can we avoid the unrealistic assumption that 
individuals are able to perform very complex calculations without costs, 
because all the computational effort is undertaken by the central 
coordinator. 
This picture of planning, which transfers the Walrasian framework 
within organization, was provided by Barone at the beginning of the 
century, when he showed that the Minister of planning in a collectivist 
society can issue appropriate orders and perfectly govern the economy on 
the basis of the same principles as the Walrasian general equilibrium 
model (Barone, 1908). 
Agents in this case send information and receive orders via the central 
coordinator, which, in turn, receives information and send orders. The 
main problem arising from this model is explaining how it is possible for 
the central coordinator to obtain and process all relevant information. In 
fact, whereas the Walrasian auctioneer issues "orders" simply by altering 
the prices on the basis of the aggregate excess demand, the tasks to be 
performed by Minister of Planning are more complex: he must transmit 
the correct order to every producer. Consequently he must have detailed 
knowledge of the economic system and his evolution over the time. It 
was the Austrian School in the 1930s (von Wiese, von Mises and von 
Hayek in particular) that first addressed this question and denied the 
possibility of central planning in a collectivist society. Even if we may 
not fully agree with this position, it is be very difficult to admit that such 
hyper-centralized system would be able to adapt to external changing 
circumstances: individuals in this context would mechanically execute 
the orders, without any autonomous capacity to decide or to plan. A 
business organization based on this kind of rigid and centralized planning 
would lack in endogenous mechanisms of reaction, and therefore would 
be unable to change and to survive on a competitive market . 
In consequence, a key problem is to understand if , beyond the 
mechanism of centralized planning, it is possible to model different 
coordination mechanisms characterized by different degrees of 
decentralization; and what level of individual knowledge, information 
processing and planning capacity they require. To move in that direction 
we must make more realistic assumptions about the individual planning 
activity, and revise the traditional opinions on the independence and 
rationality of decisions. 
As a first assumption, it is necessary to take into account that individual 
plans are formulated in a strategic context, i.e. that they depend on the 
plans implemented by other individuals; therefore the higher the 
decentralization of the coordination mechanism the greater is the amount 
of computation required of individuals to evaluate ull the consequences 
of their decisions. 
Second, and more important, we must acknowledge that within 
organizations the separation of knowledge and skills among employees is 
not total; nor can it be among firms. 
This viewpoint seems related to Simon's opinion, where he points out 
that 
"... neoclassical theory assumes that there are clear boundaries 
between the elements known as firms. In practice these 
boundaries are highly ambiguous ..... Markets represent only a part, 
if an important part, of the channels of communication and 
coordination between organizations". 
Indeed, the production of knowledge and information within a firm is not 
based on a rigid separation of skills and knowledge among economic 
agents, as happens in the Walrasian market. On the contrary, an 
organization is usually based on close interaction among its components, 
on the joint use of competencies, and on the exploitation of the positive 
externalities which arise from interactions. Within organizations, 
individuals exchange information and orders, as Coase suggests, but they 
also exchange knowledge and alter their competences and skills. 
This is a crucial difference from Walrasian assumptions, and suggest us 
to distinguish between "static" and "dynamic" planning. 
The former takes place when individual planning does not involve any 
change into the organizational shape, as in Walras and Barone's accounts. 
(A more or less centralized coordinating mechanism can render different 
individual plans reciprocally compatible, by means of orders and 
information channels.) 
The latter takes place when individual plans modify the organizational 
shape; coordination in this eventuality can be assimilated to a 
(deliberate, conscious or unconscious) process of organizational design. 
The two features I have emphasized - interdependency of individual 
plans and overlapping competences among individuals - suggest that, to 
find an explanation of the relationship between economic organizations 
and individual behaviours, we must move beyond the limits of the 
Walrasian approach. 
2 Bounded Rationality, Coordination and Learning: from Hayek to 
Simon 
Hayek went to the root of the problem of the relationship between 
individual rationality and the role of the market by incorporating it into 
the more general problem of the tole of knowledge in society, and by 
examining the nature of economic institutions. 
His point of departure was a critique of the manner in which the general 
equilibrium model had traditionally been interpreted. The model assumed 
the consumer preferences as "given" and all the technologies as freely 
available. 
In his Presidential Address of 10 November 1936 at the London 
Economic Club, Hayek contested this aspect of the model. He pointed 
out that, although technologies and preferences are indeed the givens of 
the problem, they are unknown to the majority of economic agents: they 
constitute idiosyncratic, specific, personal information and knowledge 
whose acquisition by economic agents would require unlimited capacities 
of memory and calculation. 
Under the (Walrasian) hypothesis that agents have consistent preferences 
sets, know all available technologies, and possess an unlimited capacity 
for calculation and memorization, they may be able to make fully rational 
decisions. By removing these unrealistic assumptions, and emphasizing 
that knowledge is diffused heterogeneously and asymmetrically among 
individuals Hayek implicitely assumed that the rational and cognitive 
capacities of the individual are limited. He can be considered a precursor 
of Simon's bounded human rationality approach, because his major 
hidden premise to the explanation of why economic institutions exist is 
that individual have limited capacities and competences. 
In restating this point, Simon notes that it is precisely because 
individuals are incapable of handling all the relevant knowledge and 
information necessary for rational decision-making that economic 
institutions exist. He maintains that knowledge is efficiently accumulated 
and transmitted by institutions, which fulfil tasks which are beyond the 
individual capacities. The role of the institutions is therefore paramount: 
they gather knowledge and information in such a way as to reduce the 
uncertainty of human action and broadly extend its range. 
Note that it is not only realistic but logically consistent to assume that no 
single actor is able to possess a complete and accurate picture of all 
relevant information and knowledge; should such an actor exist, this 
would annul the necessity itself of the economic institutions (and 
particularly of the market). A lucid restatement of this point, as part of a 
critique of the theory of rational expectations, is to be found in Arrow 
(1978). 
Hayek attributes a broader role to competition than was envisaged by 
the Walrasian model. In a numbe; of celebrated passages he describes 
competition as a process of discovery of the new; a process whereby 
individuals obtain the specific information they need to formulate and 
implement their plans. The central point, in his view, is that the economic 
institutions reflect the way in which the division of labour and knowledge 
among the different individuals in society has come about, and they 
guarantee its coordination. 
".... I still believe that. by what is implicit in its reasoning, 
economics has come nearer than any other social science to an 
answer to that central question of all social sciences: How can the 
combinations of fragments of knowledge existing in different 
minds bring about results which, if they were to he hrought about 
deliberately, would require a knowledge on the part of the 
directing mind which no  single person can possess'? T o  show that 
in this sense the spontaneous actions of individuals will, under 
conditions which we can define, bring about a distribution of 
resources which can be understood as if it were made according 
to a single plan, although nobody has planned it, seems to me an 
answer to the problems which has sometimes been metaphorically 
described as that of the "social mind". (Hayek, 1980, p. 54) 
According to Hayek, the market is a non-constituted institution. Like 
language and money, economic 'institutions are not born of a fully 
intentional and rational collective decision; nor they are the outcome of a 
project generated by the mind of a social architect. They are - in his view- 
the historical and unintentional product of the consolidation of inter- 
individual relationships. However, Hayek does not address the problem 
of how institutions emerge, or how "spontaneous" institutions and 
artificial institutions, i.e. those created by conscious human design, can 
coexist and interact. 
But do completely artificial institutions actually exist? And if they do, 
in what relation do they stand with "natural" ones? Hayek considered 
socialist planning to be the limiting case of artificial structures, in direct 
contrast to the natural mechanism of competition. Much of his work was 
devoted to demonstration of the impossibility of economic planning, or 
better to his contention that planning is not an institutional instrument 
able to replace the market effectively - the planner, unlike the market, is 
unable to gather all the information and knowledge required to reach an 
optimum solution. 
But, as Coase remarked one year later Hayek' Presidential Address, 
planning is the characteristic feature of any business organization, and 
therefore at least up to a certain point planning activity is expected to be 
efficient . 
 organization.^, the pioneering book written in 1958 by March and 
Simon, proposes a different and richer view, where hierarchical planning 
and designing - which typically are sciences of the artificial - and 
individual "spontaneous" decisions are interrelated. 
Before developing this point, I conclude the discussion about the 
Walrasian framework by suggesting that the appropriate context to 
compare market and organization as alternative cooperation devices, is 
not the Walrasian one, but, more promisingly, the Hayekian one. 
The reason for the failure of attempts to apply the Walrasian framework 
directly to what happens within organizations therefore seems now clear: 
the Walrasian model assume a world in which the division of labour is 
given; there is a complete separation of skills and knowledge among 
economic agents, and the creation or transfer of knowledge and skills is 
assumed to be either impossible or costless. The previous discussion 
suggests that coordination requires a more complex explanation, which 
takes account of the capacity to innovate and learn of individuals and 
organizations, in a context related to limited rationality and knowledge 
sharing. Hayek, and later Schumpeter, assume a world in which the 
creation of knowledge is the fundamental process underlying 
coordination activities and more generally economic change. But they 
did not provide clear theoretical microfoundations on which to model 
economic change. With bounded rationality theory Simon give us the 
first important step in that direction. It is therefore convenient to turn to 
the problem of knowledge acquisition and creation, along the lines of 
Simon's approach, to evaluate the potentialities of these assumptions in 
explaining the nature of cooperation within organizations. 
3 Organizational learning : microeconomic aspects. 
The idea that the learning activity plays a central role in human decision 
making derives from the pioneering work of Cyert, Simon, March and 
Newell. In 1956, in a path-breaking article which constituted a first 
crucial step in analyzing rationality within organizations, Cyert, Simon 
and Trow carried out an empirical analysis of managerial decisions which 
revealed an evident "dualism" of behaviour: 
"Decisions in organizations vary widely with respect to the extent 
to which the decision-making process is programmed. At one 
extreme we have repetitive, well defined problems (e.g.. quality 
control or production lot-size problems) involving tangible 
considerations, to which the economic models that call for finding 
the best among a set of pre-established alternatives can be applied 
rather literally. In contrast to these highly programmed and 
usually rather detailed decisions are problems of non-repetitive 
sort, often involving basic long-range questions about the whole 
strategy of the firm or some part if it, arising initially in a highly 
unstructured form and requiring a great deal of the kinds of 
search processes listed above." (Cyert, Simon and Trow. 1956. 
p.238) 
March and Simon (1958) note that in conditions well-structured from the 
cognitive and decisional viewpoint, subjects learn to solve problems, 
achieve a stable behavioural patterns of actions or, if one wishes, their 
behaviour becomes routinized. The sequence of choices confronted by 
individuals performing an organizational task constitutes a repetitive 
procedure which becomes familiar to those executing it, and presents 
well-defined alternatives codified according to the variants arising from 
changing external circumstances. 
Most of the human activity within economic organizations takes the form 
of this procedural and routinized behaviour. Within the organization, we 
can consider as routine any procedure which provides for the execution 
of a specific task; it is therefore a procedure which solves a set of 
problems internal to the organization. A procedure can be described as a 
set of instructions determining the actions to be taken when dealing with 
a particular circumstance. 
It seems natural, therefore, to model a procedure as a progmm, in the 
specific sense given to the term by computation theory, as a list of 
instructions in an artificial language. This enables us to represent 
procedures formally and to model procedural rationality (March and 
Simon, 1958, chap. 6). 
If individuals are able automatically to replicate repeated sequences of 
decisions deriving from their interactions with others, the role of routines 
becomes clear: they enable individuals to save on "rational computation" 
and radically reduce the complexity of individual decisions. In 
consequence a part of everyday decisions becomes to some extent 
"automatic" and therefore possibly tacit. More precise exploration of this 
point has been conducted by Nelson and Winter, on the basis of the 
methodological principles enunciated by M. Polanyi in Personal 
Knowledge (1958). They emphasize that some behavioural sequences 
consist of actions which are partially tacit; this feature leads the two 
authors to the problem of how tacit knowledge is formed, transferred and 
stored in memory. 
This is a starting point for exploring how cognitive skills, which arise 
through experience and cooperation, are stored in the memory and by 
consequence become building blocks for subjects who have to solve 
problems. Pursuing this line of research, Cohen and Bacdayan (1991) 
suggest that routines are stored as procedural memory. Following 
Squire's (1987) distinction between procedural and declarative memory, 
they claim that 
" procedural memory appears to be the form that stores the 
components of individual skilled actions - for both motor and 
cognitive skills. It is distinguished from ilechrative memory, 
which provides the storage of facts, propositions, and events. " 
(1991. p. 5). 
Cohen and Bacdayan use a laboratory experiment to analyze the 
emergence of procedural behavioui by two subjects involved in a game 
which requires coordination and cooperation, and its "sedimentation" in 
memory. The general point at issue here is how the acquisition, and 
memorization of cognitive skills takes place, and how its transfer is 
possible, i.e. how skills can be re-used. As Singley and Anderson show 
(1989), the range of transfer of procedurally encoded skills is very 
restricted. By consequence, learning requires effort and time, and the 
transmission of cognitive skills is at least partially opaque. 
Moreover, routines memorization is highly local and incomplete, and it 
therefore pre-supposes the human capacity to complete missing 
knowledge. This feature emerges both in theoretical (Chaitin 1987) and 
empirical frameworks (Singley and Anderson,l989), (Cohen and 
Bacdayan, 1991), (Egidi, 1993). 
Individuals involved in games which require cooperation, after the initial 
period of learning, do not memorize the detailed steps of organizational 
procedures; they do not keep all knowledge and information they need to 
play stored in memory, but create and memorize sets of simple "meta 
rules" which allow to re-create the organizational routines. These rules 
are elementary "Condition-Action" rules (in the standard sense of the 
cognitive sciences), which are the result of sub-goals identification, i.e. 
of a spontaneous division of knowledge among agents. Agents store in 
procedural memory these rules, which embody mutual relations and 
enable them jointly to recreate the routines at any particular moment. 
To summarize some of the previous issues: even if we are still far from 
being able to frame the complex problem of knowledge creation and 
transmission within a unique theoretical approach, the assumption that 
procedures are the micro-units of human behaviour in organizations is 
strongly confirmed by observations, field research and experiments. They 
are partially tacit, opaque and incomplete. The latter property is 
particularly relevant because of its consequences on organizational 
change: the fact that individuals do not usually possess full knowledge of 
organizational procedures, but are able to recreate its missing 
components, implies that they have the capacity to solve micro-problems 
autonon~ously. The problem is now to clarify the relationship between 
this kind of micro-innovative activity and top-down planning and 
designing managerial activity in order to better understand how 
organizational change take place. 
4 Organizational learning and the division of knowledge 
When managerial decisions are taken in ill-defined and uncertain 
conditions, one successful strategy of solution is based on the attempt to 
decompose the problem to be solved in sub- problems easier to 
approach. This procedure, carefully analyzed in Organizations (7.2. The 
process of innovation) is now became a classic approach to problem 
solving in Artificial Intelligence. (Newell and Simon (1958) and (1972)). 
A well-known feature of this procedure is recursivity: subjects seek to 
decompose the problem to be solved into sub-problems which they hope 
will prove easier for them to handle. If some of these sub-problems are 
still too complex, they are in turn decomposed. The procedure continues 
recursively until easily solvable sub-problems have been obtained. If 
successful, the decomposition procedure structures the original problem 
into a hierarchy of inter-related sub-problems. 
This procedure is typical of top-down planning activity within 
organizations; it gives rise to a recursive division of tasks which, if 
achieved successfully, can be used by the top management to give a new 
shape to the division of labour, knowledge and competences within an 
organization. 
This does not mean that the hierarchized structures which perform 
different but inter-related tasks within organizations are the outcome of a 
purely artificial and centralized process of planning; on the contrary, 
planning and organizational design can be, to a certain extent, distributed 
activities. 
It is now convenient to recall the distinction between planning (static 
planning) and organizational designing (dynamic planning). In the first 
case an organizational hierarchy is supposed to be "given" with a related 
division of labour and coordination mechanisms ; individuals, at 
different hierarchical levels and with different competences, may have 
discretionary power in realizing a general plan (top-down planning), or 
they may actively propose new solutions, new "local" plans, which are 
coordinated by means of non-centralized mechanisms (for example, 
bottom-up planning). But they formulate their plans according to a given 
division of labour. 
In the second case the activity is to design new organizational solutions: 
the problem is to change the organizational structure, i.e. the division of 
labour and the coordination mechanism. 
Turning our attention to the first case, note that, even if they operate 
through strongly hierarchized structures, organizations in the real world 
do not require their operational units merely to execute procedures, or 
blindly to implement plans meticulously set out by the upper levels of the 
hierarchy; on the contrary, within real organizations people continuously 
modify procedures and adapt it to external change. 
Therefore, even when planning is a top-down centralized activity, it has 
a "conjectural" character, for bounded rationality reasons : on the one 
hand, in fact, the higher levels of the hierarchy must formulate plans in 
extremely general and open-ended terms, because the ways to implement 
general plans into details are not and cannot be known a-priori and 
computed ; on the other , the lower levels do not merely execute perfectly 
defined and detailed plans in "mechanical" fashion. Execution of plans 
requires the ability to interpret and to adapt general ideas, and to solve 
problems and conflicts that arise so that these ideas can be implemented. 
I now turn to the case of organizational design. As in the previous case, 
consider a situation between the two extreme alternatives, respectively 
the centralized and the distributed coordination of designing activity. 
Suppose that the top management puts into place a re-design of the 
organization is in order to react to some kind of environmental change. 
Again, the implementation of the new division of labour within the 
organization which is required by such a change gives rise to a complex 
process of adaptation which is far from what believed by the traditional 
theory of planning: from one hand in fact the implementation of a new 
organizational design requires managers and employees to re-think their 
jobs and revise their competences; from the other, to be effective, any 
new design requires local checks and readjustments, i.e. the resolution of 
cognitive conflicts arising from the match among the general 
requirements of the project and the specific, idiosyncratic knowledge 
arising from the personal knowledge of any single agent. 
We can conclude that the micro problem solving activity is a 
fundamental source of organizational change, which displays his effects 
also beyond the scope of the individual activity within organization. 
Individuals have very incomplete knowledge of the organizational 
routines, as we have seen, but they have the ability to recreate the missing 
parts of it: they can modify and adapt general plans to specific context or 
micro-innovate, i.e. find new local solutions to the problems, whatever 
their position in the hierarchical-pyramid may be. When applied to 
organizations, the ability to complete knowledge suggest an explanation 
of how organizational procedures develop and change, because allow us 
to attribute to individuals a permanent ability to micro innovate and to 
modify procedures. 
A question implicitly arises from our discussion: why realistic examples 
of the two extreme situation of coordination, the fully centralized and the 
distributed one, are so rare? In relation to the first case, we have some 
historical examples in army organizations, where is easy to see that a 
fully top-down hierarchized structure is extremely fragile because of its 
inability to react to external changing circumstances. In the latter, to my 
knowledge there are no historical examples of economic organizations in 
which the design of new division of labour is a fully decentralized 
process ( a "spontaneous", Hayekian organization). 
Instead, a clear example of distributed design is provided by the 
Schumpeterian picture of "creative destruction1', which can be considered 
as a form of design activity coordinated by the market. Schumpeter's 
analysis starts from the "circular flow" condition, where producers and 
consumer are in equilibrium and profits and interest rates are close to 
zero. These conditions, which describe approximately the status of the 
economy during the phase of depression within the business cycle, 
provide new opportunities for innovators. They create new products or 
new technologies which are "tested" on the market. If the first innovative 
wave has successful results, the innovations are adopted by imitators, 
spread through the entire economic system and give rise to a phase of 
prosperity. New skills, new competences and a new division of labour 
among firms are created within the economy. At the end of phase of 
prosperity the economy exhibit a different division of labour, and a new 
competences and skills distribution, as the result of the competition 
among firms and of selection by market. In consequence the outcome of 
the process of creative destruction can be interpreted as being the result 
of competition among different projects, undertaken by different rival 
firms, which are selected by market mechanisms. By this point of view 
markets operate as a distributed mechanism of project and design 
coordination. 
This phenomenon has many analogies with the organizational learning 
process which takes place inside firms, and therefore may be interesting 
to emphasize the differences and try to explain their nature. 
The most relevant difference . regards the relationship between 
cooperation and competition. Schumpeter focuses his attention much 
more narrowly on the rivalry among firms producing similar goods using 
different technologies than on the effects of innovation on vertical 
integration, which presupposes cooperation among firms. This point has 
been analyzed by Williamson in his description of "the fundamental 
transformation" (Williamson 1985) . Within organization, on the 
contrary, a high amount of cooperation, based on common knowledge 
and competence overlapping, is needed to realize new projects: therefore 
the problem is how the internal relationship must be designed to mediate 
between the need to maintain a certain degree of rivalry among 
employees and the need to encourage their collaboration. 
Imagine that employees and managers possess - to different extents - the 
capacities of autonomy and creativity which Schumpeter attributes to 
entrepreneurs. The problem is why there are not examples of modern 
business organization where the design of new division of labour is a 
fully decentralized process, and employees do have full and autonomous 
capacity to innovate: this lead us to wonder which relationship exist 
among authority, decentralisation and control within organization. I will 
recall some aspects of the problem in the next paragraph, by discussing 
the relationship between New Institutionalist's and Simon's approach to 
employment relationship. 
I shall not further discuss the features of organizational learning here: the 
reader is referred to the literature, and in particular to the wide range of 
works collected in Decisions and Organizations by J .  March (1988). I 
limit myself to note that, when considered in its connections with the 
process of division of labour, the notion of coordination takes a different 
meaning from the one implicit in neoclassical economics. For the latter 
coordination means making individual and independent decisions 
compatible, here instead the problem of coordination concerns the 
relationship between the top-down activity to design new organizational 
set-ups and the adaptive, intelligent bottom-up reactions by managers and 
employees, which should give rise to a better adaptation of the 
organization to the external environment. 
5 Opportunism and loyalty: feed back mechanisms for adjustment. 
In order to define and achieve its goals in an open environment, an 
organization must be able to redefine its internal tasks, and therefore its 
internal division of labour. Learning, as the adaptation of the organization 
to changing conditions in the external environment, thus give rise to an 
internal reorganization undertaken in order to pursue pre-established 
goals more successfully. As we have seen, this process cannot be rigidly 
hierarchical ; but on the opposite side, we have no evidence of economic 
organizations characterized by a fully decentralized process of 
organizational designing. A key point to focus why the extreme case of 
centralized and decentralized designing are not working is how 
competition and cooperation mechanism works to guarantee the creation 
and constant exchange of information and knowledge within 
organization. The classical feature of knowledge is his partial 
inappropriability and the impossibility to evaluate it a priori. Within 
organizations, by consequence, to evaluate the individual contribution to 
the achievement of a common goals is a very uncertain and "fuzzy" task. 
In addition, the division of labour and competences give rise to a strong 
asymmetry of information and knowledge within organization, and by 
consequence there is room for opportunistic behaviour and shirking to 
arise. 
In the framework of the so-called New Institutional Economics, to 
prevent shirking, "principals" must design incentive contracts in such a 
way that the interest of the firm and the self-interest of the "agent" are 
made to coincide - to a degree. 
In contrast with this view, based on the idea to control opportunistic 
behaviours, let me recall H. Simon' approach, based on the 
"identification" principle. 
Simon claims that the employee enters the firm on the understanding that 
he will receive a salary in return for willingness to accept authority. 
Consequently, Simon maintains that enforcement of employment 
contracts does not present any particular difficulty. In his view, the key 
element in an organization is the loyalty of its employees. 
Let us briefly examine the boundaries between loyalty and opportunism, 
and compare New Institutional and Simon's approach on this point. If 
identification exists, the employee who works loyally must not be 
frustrated in his expectations : therefore the organization must be able to 
discover able and creative employees and it must also be able to enhance 
their abilities. Now, what are the typical features of this kind of 
employee? 
If the organization must be flexible, able to learn and to adapt, the most 
important quality of its employees is not blind obedience to authority but 
instead the ability to critically and autonomously evaluate new problems, 
and the ability to deal with disagreements with superiors; this is the 
typical case of "voice" as analyzed by Hirschman.(l970) 
Thus the following abilities are vital to an innovative organization: a 
high propensity to evaluate autonomously new situations (solve and 
frame problems), and a high propensity to resort to the "voice" option 
when conflicting solutions, or opinions arise in a context of loyalty. 
Let me add two qualifications to Simon's analysis of the employment 
relation : first, employees must not only be able to perform a set of tasks 
but they must be able to learn how to perform new and unexpected tasks. 
Secondly, although it is true that employees accept authority in exchange 
for wages, such acceptance must be conditioned and active in the sense 
of the "voice" option. The organization, for its part, must exercise its 
authority in such a way that it leaves discretionary margins for decision 
making by its subordinates so that conflicts of opinion can be resolved by 
allowing the most competent opinion to prevail, thereby reinforcing the 
identification mechanism. 
I wish to conclude the paragraph with brief discussion of the limits 
which creative and loyal behaviour may encounter within organizations 
and therefore the risk that efficient and dynamic organization may lapse 
into inefficiency or decline. What follows does not pretend to be an 
exhaustive analysis; it is only a brief sketch based on the points discussed 
above. 
Consider the situations that may arise in the case of decisional conflict 
between subordinates and their superiors and when authority is blindly 
enforced. 
In many situations, employees have more specific knowledge of the 
situation, can evaluate it more carefully then the controller, or are simply 
better able to frame and solve the problems which arise in ongoing 
activity. Therefore, if contracts require the blind acceptance of authority 
in exchange for wages, when disagreement arises over how to perform a 
given task between an employee and his principal, the conflicting 
opinions have neither room nor solution. Intelligent employees realize 
that trying to use the "voice" option will be unsuccessful and that they 
must therefore accept stupid orders. ( thereby being frustrated). 
In turn, a mediocre principal will prefer blind obedience to voice, and 
will try to avoid conflicting situations which could reveal his 
incompetence. He therefore has a strong incentive to reduce the area of 
common knowledge and competence between himself and employees. 
A similar result arises from the behaviour of inefficient employees, who 
risk being discovered and punished, or perhaps dismissed. Therefore if an 
employee chooses the opportunistic strategy of minimizing his effort to 
reach a high standard of ability and competence, and therefore has low 
competence, then he has a strong incentive to avoid being discovered 
and will try to evade control by his superiors. 
He can do this by using the same strategy as the incompetent supervisor: 
reducing the area of common knowledge and competence. In situations of 
a potential conflict of opinions, he will blindly follow orders. Therefore 
his principal will not receive useful feed-back on the decisions he has 
taken. 
Thus, on the one hand we have agents who try to avoid control; on the 
other, principals who do not accept discussion: Both form a group within 
the hierarchy, a hidden group of mediocre employees who can survive if 
they are able to increase informational asymmetry or - which is the same 
thing - reduce the common knowledge area in order to protect 
themselves. Similar kinds of second-best employees exist at every 
hierarchical level. 
If this group fails to reduce or to avoid controls and disagreements, it 
cannot expand, and it will survive as a marginal "error" in the process of 
organizational learning and adaptation: in this case, at any moment, 
skilful subordinates can challenge incompetent superiors, and able 
superiors can discover the errors of mediocre employees. Thus an 
efficient organization applies pressure - and in certain cases also moral 
pressure - on slack employees and managers. This depicts a possible 
"virtuous" circle. 
Yet the organization may also lapse into decline. As long as the size of 
the organization increases - despite its internal inefficiency - the 
dimension of the hidden group expands. Therefore if the hidden group 
has protected itself satisfactorily, the situation is opaque and it is difficult 
to detect the causes of and those responsible for inefficiencies. Creative 
competition thus becomes a very inconvenient way to reach a top 
position because there is a safe, alternative strategy: joining the second- 
best group. 
Therefore skilful employees may also be tempted to adopt the 
opportunistic strategy ; advancements, in fact, depend on affiliation and 
obedience, not on skills, results and managerial ability. Opportunism may 
spread if the expression of voice and loyalty are systematically 
frustrated. This gives rise to a strong reduction of the areas of common 
knowledge between employees and managers and therefore reduces the 
organization's ability to react to errors and adapt to change. Hence if 
blind obedience to the authority principle prevails over voice, the 
organization may decline into a bureaucratic and inefficient hierarchy. A 
vicious circle is thus established. 
6 Final Remarks: virtuous and adverse selection within organizations. 
Summing up, within organizations the virtuous mechanism of 
competitive selection does not have robust self-enforcing characteristics; 
under certain conditions, it can be overwhelmed by a mechanism of 
adverse selection, which can lead the organization toward a very sub- 
optimal "order" characterized by a strongly authoritarian and scarcely 
competent hierarchy. The reasons why an adverse selection process can 
arise have been briefly suggested above: if the area of common 
knowledge among individuals involved in the realization of a set of 
common tasks is very restricted, there is room neither for reciprocal 
control and the prevention of shirking nor for exploiting the positive 
externalities which follow the emergence of creative behaviour. A 
tayloristic division of labour, with a rigid separation of competences and 
a minimization of the common knowledge area among individuals, only 
apparently simplifies individual activities within the organization: in 
reality this configuration prevent the working of the most important 
communication channels among individuals, and therefore prevent the 
changes from occurring. 
The micro roots of this phenomenon have been clearly evidenced by a 
large set of experimental results in the cognitive sciences : in particular, 
as we have seen, the transfer of cognitive skills is limited and requires 
effort, and organizational routines are partially opaque to individuals. 
The fact that individuals have incomplete knowledge of the routines 
involved in their everyday activity, has a twofold consequence: on the 
one hand, they can complete it either by recreating its missing 
components or by modifying it, and therefore even during the execution 
of standard routines the ability to re-create missing parts is a continuous 
source for potential micro-innovations. 
On the other hand the boundaries among different competences and skills 
cannot be extremely net and clear, and an overlapping competence area is 
needed. The smaller the overlapping competence areas among 
individuals within an organization, as in the tayloristic division of labour, 
the higher the cognitive effort required to cooperate for the fulfilment of 
a common goal. Consequently, because of a restriction of the common 
knowledge and competence area, the relationship among individuals 
become more opaque, and their ability to evaluate the each other's 
competence and actions is strongly reduced. Now, the difficulty of 
evaluating the quality and the uses of goods (Akerlof, 1970) is the most 
important reason which give rise to the adverse selection on the markets. 
The similarities are clear: exactly as happens in markets, where the areas 
of competence among consumers and producers of a good are totally 
separated and by consequence consumers cannot fully evaluate goods, 
within tayloristic organizations individuals encounter major difficulties in 
evaluating the products and the performances of their colleagues 
(superiors or subordinates). These difficulties, in a organizational context 
where the common competence area is too restricted, are therefore the 
main source of opportunistic behaviours. 
In order to reinforce loyalty and identification, individuals (employees 
and managers) must be rewarded by the mechanism of competitive 
selection. The organizational design, apart from the awareness of the 
designers, is therefore crucial to determine the virtuous working of the 
mechanism of competitive selection, since it may allow a transparent 
common cognitive area to arise. Only on this basis conflicts of opinion 
(and of interests) can be resolved with the prevalence of the most 
competent opinion, the identification mechanism can be reinforced and 
can loyalty overcome opportunism. 
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